I’m looking for a rigorous answer to a systems-evidence question.
Suppose an AI model can interpret context, propose actions, and generate persuasive explanations—but it is not supposed to decide its own authority, applicable policy scope, acceptance conditions, or release status.
What is the strongest evidence that would convince you those controls actually remained outside model interference?
For me, a credible answer cannot be “the model was instructed to follow policy” or “the model usually behaved responsibly.” The evidence has to show that a model’s output cannot silently redefine the boundary that constrains it.
I would expect a serious test to include:
- A policy or authorization boundary that is independently represented and checkable;
- Adversarial prompts attempting to broaden scope, reinterpret acceptance, bypass expiry, or convert ambiguity into approval;
- An observable effect boundary that prevents action when authorization is absent;
- Preserved HOLD, denial, conflict, and incomplete-evidence outcomes—not only successful runs;
- A verifier whose authority and failure modes are distinct from the acting model; and
- A way to inspect whether policy, scope, acceptance, or release changed during the attempted action.
My view is that a probabilistic model can be useful for reasoning and proposals, but those outputs should not automatically become permission, acceptance, completion, or release.
I have published an initial public formulation of Artificial Deterministic Intelligence (ADI) here:
I also have a small public Cortex governed-memory challenge that demonstrates bounded checks around scope isolation, expiry, supersession, conflict/HOLD handling, provenance, and reset:
These are bounded public artifacts, not a claim of complete system verification or security certification.
What test would you require before accepting the claim that policy scope and acceptance remained outside model interference?